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Abstract 
In 2009, Zheng et al. proposed an efficient password-based group key agreement protocol resistant to the dictionary 
attacks by adding password-authentication services to a non-authenticated multi-party key agreement protocol 
proposed by Horng. They claimed that the proposed protocol is very efficient since it only requires constant rounds to 
agree upon a session key, and each user broadcasts a constant number of messages and only requires four 
exponentiations. Under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption, they shown the proposed protocol is provably 
secure in both the ideal-cipher model and the random-oracle model. But in this paper, we show that the protocol 
Zheng et al. proposed is vulnerable to an active insider attack. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of [CEIS 2011] 
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1. Introduction
Authenticated group key agreement (GKA) protocols enable a set of users communicating over an
insecure, open network to establish a shared secret called session key and furthermore to be guaranteed 
that they are indeed sharing this session key with each other (i.e., with their intended partners). The 
session key may be subsequently used to achieve some cryptographic goals such as confidentiality or data 
integrity. Authenticated GKA protocols allow two or more users to agree upon session key even in the 
presence of active adversaries. These protocols are designed to deal with the problem to ensure users in 
the group setting that no other principals aside from members of the group can learn any knowledge about 
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the session key. Hence, authenticated GKA protocols can provide a natural secure mechanism for 
achieving secure multicasting communication in numerous grouporiented scenarios, such as video 
conferencing, secure replicated database, collaborative applications and distributed computations. 
Since the elegant two-party key agreement protocol [1] was proposed by Diffie-Hellman in 1976, 
many papers have extended this two-party Diffie-Hellman protocol to the group setting. These GKA 
protocols are classified into two kinds: non-authenticated [2–5,15] and authenticated [7,9,11,12,14]. 
Burmester and Desmedt [2, 3] proposed a well-known non-authenticated GKA protocol (BD for short) 
with constant number of rounds under the broadcast channel. Horng [4] focused on the computational 
efficiency of GKA protocols and proposed a non-authenticated GKA protocol which requires only two 
rounds of communication. Recently, Katz and Yung [6] proposed a scalable compiler that transforms any 
GKA protocol into an authenticated one. They also applied their compiler to add authentication services 
for the BD protocol. However, this solution needs the support provided by the Public Key Infrastructure 
(PKI) which leads to be more computation overhead. 
Password is one of the ideal authentication approaches to agree a session key in the absence of PKI or 
pre-distributed symmetric keys. There are several works about how to design the PGKA protocol [8–12]. 
Zheng et al. presented an efficient and secure password-based group key agreement protocol in static 
group setting according to adding password-authentication services to the protocol proposed by Horng [4]. 
In their protocol, the legitimate users can share only a low entropy human-memorable password and 
communicating over an insecure channel controlled by the active adversary, to agree upon a high-entropy 
session key among themselves. They emphasize that their protocol is provably secure in the random-
oracle and ideal-cipher models under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. But in this paper, 
we point out that Zheng et al.’s password-based group key agreement protocol is not authenticated and 
easy to be forged or modified. And we give a method that the insider attacker can force all group 
members. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we review the computational 
assumptions and Zheng et al.’s password-based group key agreement protocols. In Section 3, we propose 
the attack method in details. In Section 4, we conclude. 
2. Preliminaries 
2.1. Decis n l Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption io a
Let G=〈g〉 be any finite cyclic group of prime order q. Informally, the DDH assumption is that it is 
difficult to distinguish the following real Diffie-Hellman distribution Γreal and random Diffie-Hellman 
distribution Γrand:
Γreal = {gx, gy, gxy | x, y∈RZq}, 
Γrand = {gx, gy, gz | x, y, z∈RZq}
More formally, if we define the advantage function  as )(AdvddhG A[ ] [ ]randreal YYAXXAA Γ⊂=−Γ⊂== 1)(Pr1)(Pr)(AdvddhG , we say that the DDH assumption holds in group G
if  is negligible for any probabilistic polynomial time adversary A. We denote  the 
maximum value of  overall adversary A running in time at most t.
)(AdvddhG A )t(AdvddhG
)(AdvddhG A
2.2. Multi-Decisional Diffie-Hellman (MDDH) assumption 
We present another computational assumption based on the Diffie-Hellman assumption. Let us define 
real Multi Diffie-Hellman distribution Пreal and random Multi Diffie-Hellman distribution Пrand of size n
as follows: 
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{ }qRnnjxxnix Zxxgg jji ∈=Π ≤≤≤≤ + ,,}{,} 111real 1 K{ }qRnnnjynix Zyyxxgg ji ∈=Π −≤≤≤≤ 11111real ,,,,,}{,} KK
We define the advantage function as)(AdvmddhG A
]|1)(Pr[]|1)(Pr[)(AdvmddhG randreal YYAxXAA Π∈=−Π∈== .
The MDDH assumption holds if  is negligible for any probabilistic polynomial time 
adversary A. Similar; we denote Adv  the maximum value of  overall adversary A running in 
time at most t.
)(AdvmddhG A
)(tmddhG )(AdvmddhG A
2.3. Review of Zheng et al.'s protocol 
At first, we present the following notations are used throughout this paper: 
Nomenclature 
q: a secure large prime.  
p: a large prime such that p=2q+1.
Gq: a subgroup of quadratic residues in , that is *pZ { }*2q |G pZii ∈= .
g: a generator for the subgroup Gq.
( kDE ,k ) : an ideal-cipher system. Ek is a keyed permutation over Gq and Dk is inverse of Ek. k is the 
 symmetric key. 
H: , a hash function for generating the symmetric key. { } { } Hl1,01,0 * →
G: , a hash function for generating the session key. { } { } Gl1,01,0 * →
F: , a hash function for key confirmations. { } { } Fl1,01,0 * →
lH, lG and lF denote outputted bit-length of H, G and F, respectively. Without loss of generality, let 
U={u1,u2,…,un} be the initial set of users that want to generate a session key. Each user ui has a specific 
index i. Note that in the following, the indices are taken in a cycle, e.g.: ui−1, ui+1 are the left and right 
neighbors of ui for 1≤i≤n (un+1=u1,u0=un). x∈RX means that element x is chosen uniformly random in 
set X.
Suppose n users share a low-entropy password pw which is uniformly drawn from a small dictionary 
of size N, and wish to agree a high-entropy common session key among themselves. Their PGKA 
protocol is obtained by modifying the non-authenticated GKA protocol of Horng [4] by using password 
encrypted authentication mechanism. The protocol was described as follows: 
Step1: Each user ui (1≤i≤n) chooses a random nonce Ni and broadcasts (ui, Ni). Upon receiving all (uj,
Nj) (1≤j≤n, j≠i), ui sets session S={(ui, Ni)|1≤i≤n}.
Step2: Each user ui chooses xi∈RZq, computes and broadcasts , where ,
ki=H(S, i, pw).
)(~ iki yEy i= pgy ixi mod≡
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Step3: Each user ui decrypts , , and u1 computes left key , right 
key , where R1∈RGq.
)~( 11 1 −− −= iki yDy i
ixL
)~( 11 1 ++ += iki yDy i
R
11 Rz L =
pyz xR mod121 ≡
ui (1<i<n) computes left key , right key .pyzi mod1−≡
n
i i
un computes left key , right key , where Rn∈RGq.
pyz ixi mod1+≡
pyz xnLn mod1−≡ n
Then eache user ui(1≤i≤n) computes and broadcasts . Notes that .
R
n Rz =
pzzz RiLii mod≡ LiRi zz 1+=
Step4: Each user ui computes  exactly using the same approach in the Step3 
of Horng’s protocol, then computes and broadcasts his key confirmation  where 
.
pgK nn xxxxxxi mod13221 −+++−≡ K
),,,,( ii KiSFF α={ }njzy ji ≤≤= 1|),~(α
Step5: After receiving and checking all key confirmations, user ui computes session key as 
, .),,( ii KSGsk β= { }njFzy jjj ≤≤= 1|),,~(β
3. Attack on Zheng et al.'s protocol 
Although Zheng et al.’s declared their protocol provide security. In our analysis, we point out the flaw 
of Zheng et al.’s protocol in insider attack. The attack process is described as follows: 
Let U={u1,u2,…,un} be the initial set of users that want to generate a session key. As description in 
section 2.3, the n users share a low-entropy password pw. ui−1, ui+1 are the left and right neighbors of ui for 
1≤i≤n (un+1=u1,u0=un). We suppose that user u*∈U had participated in a previous session to make a 
group key. We assume u* can control the network of ur∈U who he/she want to impersonate. 
Step1: Each user u (1≤i≤n) chooses a random nonce Ni and broadcasts (Ui, Ni). Upon receiving all 
(uj, Nj) (1≤j≤n, j≠i), Ui sets session S={(ui, Ni)|1≤i≤n}.
Step2: Each user ui chooses xi∈RZq, computes and broadcasts i , where ,
ki=H(S, i, pw). Then u*∈U who want to want to impersonate ur∈U to the other users intercept and 
capture the message ur broadcasted and forge the message as follows: 
)(~ iki yEy = pgy ixi mod≡
u* picks , computes , where , kr=H(S, r, pw);qRr
u* broadcasts  as he/she was ur.
Zx ∈*
*~y
)(~ ** rkr yEy i= pgy rxr mod
**
≡
r
Step3: Each user ui decrypts
−i
,
1 +
. So user ur-1 and ur+1 decrypt r .
User u* as ur decrypts , . And u1 computes left key z , right key 
, where R1∈RGq.
)~( 11 1 −− = iki yDy
)~( 11 −− rk yD r 1+ =ry
ixL
)~( 11+ += iki yDy i
)~( 11 ++ rk yD r
)~( *rkr yDy =
1R1− =ry 1L =
pyz xR mod121 ≡
ui (1<i<n, i≠r) computes left key , right key . So u* as ur computes left 
key , right key .
pyz ii mod1−≡
py rxr mod
*
1+
R
pyz ixiRi mod1+≡
pyz rxrLr mod
*
1
*
−
≡ z Ri* ≡
nxun computes left key , right key , where Rn∈RGq.pyz Ln mod1−≡ n nn
Then each user ui (1≤i≤n, i≠r) computes and broadcasts . Notes that . Here 
.
Rz =
pzzz RiLii mod≡
xxxxxx ** +++++ KK
L
i
R
i zz 1+=
pzzz RrLrr mod*** ≡
Step4: Each user ui (1≤i≤n, i≠r) computes  exactly using the 
same approach in the Step3 of Horng’s protocol, then computes and broadcasts his/her key confirmation 
 where 
pgK nnrrrr xxxxi mod1113221* −+−+−≡
{ }),,,,( ** ii KiSFF α= { }),~(, ** rr zyrj U≠1|),~( njzy ≤≤=α ji
Step5: After receiving and checking all key confirmations, user ui computes session key as 
,
.
),,( *** ii KSGsk β= { } { }),,~(,1|),,~( **** rrrjjj FzyrjnjFzy U≠≤≤=β .
As in the above attack, any user can be an attacker who can impersonate any one of the users set to the 
others. As an insider user in Zheng et al.’s password-based group key agreement protocol, the others can’t 
authenticate him/her, because the n users share a common password.  
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have shown that Zheng et al.’s password-based key agreement is not as secure as 
stated by the authors. Our proposed attack compromised Zheng et al.’s protocol, causing the user of the 
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group to fail to agree upon a common communication key. Thus, the group members cannot communicate 
together security. 
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